That mission quickly went sideways when fighting broke out between that coalition and rebels from the Permanent Strategic Framework, an ethnically Tuareg separatist group. In retreat, Wagner and Malian forces were ambushed by militants from the al-Qaida affiliate Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM.

Upward of 80 Wagner personnel and over 40 Malian soldiers were reportedly killed in the fighting. Among the casualties was Nikita Fedyanin, who ran Wagner’s popular Telegram channel The Grey Zone. While Tuareg rebels and JNIM were quick to celebrate their success, Mali and Wagner sought to downplay their losses.

And understandably so. The defeat in Tinzaouaten puts both the Wagner Group and Russia in a bind. It signals to African leaders the limits of having Moscow-backed mercenaries as a counterterrorism partner and regime protector, especially in a complex security environment such as Mali’s. But it also challenges Moscow’s strategy on the continent.

Since the death of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, a year ago, Moscow has tried to take over the group’s operations by establishing the Africa Corps, a Defence Ministry-controlled project designed to resemble Wagner that aims to bring Wagner fighters directly under the command and control of the Russian state. But this has proven more challenging than Moscow anticipated and has complicated Russia’s plans to expand its partnerships across Africa via the offer of support from private military companies.

The Tinzaouaten incident was a major blow to Wagner, representing its largest known loss of life in Africa. For context, over its nearly decadelong counterterrorism mission in Mali, the French lost a total of 59 soldiers. France’s approach to counterterrorism in Mali helped sow the seeds of military discontent that led to multiple coups between 2020 and 2021. It also laid the groundwork for Mali’s coup leaders to turn to Wagner rather than Paris for its security needs.

Since entering Mali in December 2021 — and especially since the death of Prigozhin — Wagner forces have been able to claim some successes. In November, Russian mercenaries helped the Malian army retake the city of Kidal, a separatist stronghold.

That success may have led to overconfidence; as the Tinzaouaten incident shows, there are very real security challenges across Mali, and Wagner’s tactics, including indiscriminate violence and targeting civilians, are far from the most effective tools for addressing Mali’s security crises.

Though the Tinzaouten incident was Wagner’s largest known loss in Africa, it is not its first. Back in 2019, Wagner forces infamously over promised and underdelivered in a short-lived counterterrorism campaign in Mozambique. In that case, Wagner lasted just a few months before withdrawing after it became apparent it was ill-equipped, underprepared and too dismissive of its local Mozambican military partners.

Though the recent events in Mali are not analogous with that, Wagner’s abandonment of Mozambique may weigh on the minds of Mali’s junta leaders following the group’s latest setback. Questions abound about whether Wagner or its successor, the Africa Corps, will remain invested in Malian security.

There is also the potential for increasing tension between the Malian army and its Russian partners over the security mission and who is calling the shots. In addition to testing that relationship now, it could also lead to friction and other problems down the road.

Russia has tried to assuage concerns in the aftermath of the Tinzaouaten attack. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov contacted his Malian counterpart to reaffirm Russia’s commitment to the country. But talk is cheap. Whether the Kremlin plans to replenish Wagner’s losses by deploying more personnel remains an open question.

More importantly, the problems plaguing Mali can’t be solved at the barrel of a gun, and both Moscow’s and Mali’s current regimes have proven themselves disinterested in nonmilitary solutions — such as negotiating with non-state actors — to real or perceived security threats.

And Russia’s engagement in Mali is far from altruistic. Mali is Africa’s fourth-largest producer of gold. Like Wagner, Moscow wants a piece of that market. In November, Russia signed an agreement with Mali to construct the country’s largest gold refinery. On the surface, it looks like this could be an economic boost for Mali, but the project’s timeline is unclear. The effort also has neocolonialist undertones, despite Russia’s rhetoric to the contrary.

There is, however, a scenario in which Wagner benefits from the latest setback. As several security experts of Africa’s Sahel region have noted, the losses may actually help bolster Wagner’s reputation with Mali’s military chiefs and the Malian population in general; a willingness to fight and die alongside partners is a strong signal.

For states like Mali that have long been wary of foreign intervention, Wagner’s willingness to get in the fight and take on missions that the French and Western security partners were unwilling to execute has resonated with parts of the population.

The setback for Wagner in Mali may benefit Moscow in another unexpected way. Days after the incident, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s military intelligence insinuated that Ukraine may have played a role in providing intelligence to Tuareg groups.

Whether posturing or true, that messaging led Mali to cut diplomatic ties with Ukraine. Neighbouring Niger quickly followed suit. Ukraine has since vehemently denied involvement. Regardless, this dynamic illustrates the spillover in competition between Moscow and Kyiv.

Ukraine stands to benefit from Wagner’s failures in Africa, forcing Wagner clients to consider the value of their partnerships with Moscow. But as Mali’s reaction suggests, such efforts can clearly backfire. Even so, for Russia, Wagner’s losses create more challenges than opportunities. Moscow may be on the hook for Wagner’s failures in Africa, especially as it seeks to supplant Wagner with the Africa Corps.

Events like those that unfolded in late July can no longer be easily explained away by the Kremlin. As John Lechner, an expert on Wagner and Russian security, noted, Moscow has allowed the Wagner brand to live on in Mali, in part to give Russia cover for these types of security failures. How long Moscow can continue that pageantry — denying that Wagner’s failures are Russia’s failures too, particularly with Mali’s government — is up for debate.

Despite the clear value that Mali’s junta saw in bringing in Wagner, at some point the mission will need to scale up or events like those in Tinzaouaten could become more common. This is especially likely if the Malian army seeks to continue to expand its counterinsurgency mission.

Moscow surely doesn’t want to jeopardise its relationship with Mali’s coup leaders in the capital, Bamako. But it is also walking a delicate balance, wary of empowering the remnants of Wagner in any meaningful way that might lead the group to act out against Moscow’s interests in Africa and elsewhere. Moreover, grand ambitions to recruit tens of thousands of Africa Corps personnel have reportedly fallen woefully short, limiting Moscow’s options.

So while the Tinzaouaten incident offers a glimpse into Mali’s very challenging security environment, it also highlights the limits of hitching your wagon to Russian mercenaries — be they under the banner of Wagner or reformed under Russia’s Africa Corps.